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Abstract
The crux of strategic management is evidently about doing the right strategic choices. From a
large set of different possible choices the top management team must select the one(s) that give
competitive advantage for a company. However, many research results show that managers tend
to select strategies they are familiar with, regardless of the strategic optimality. We construct and
present a Strategic Choices Set model which is able to identify the available and implementable
choices for top management. The model is based on well established and empirically validated
theories of Upper Echelons, Industry Strategies, and Capital Structure. The ideal strategic choice
should fulfill three simultaneous conditions: i) it belongs to the top management’s expertise, ii) it
has recognizable and proven value in the industry, and iii) the company has financial resources to
implement it. The model is tested in the ICT industry, concentrating on two companies that
operate also in smart phone sector, namely Nokia and Apple. The main contributions are the
presented model and the pondering of strategic options in ICT industry based on emergence of
cloud computing technology.

Keywords
Strategic Management, Strategic Choice, Strategic Choice Sets, Upper Echelon, Industry
Strategy, Capital Structure, Financial Position, Leverage.

1. Introduction
There is a long research tradition in areas of industrial strategies (e.g. Hambrick, 1983), capital
structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) and upper echelon (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Furthermore, the association between these research areas has also been examined (see Carpenter
et al. 2004; O’Brien, 2003; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). However, no one has linked these three
areas before.
Generally, strategy evaluation tries to identify how companies are competing against each other
and to assess their competitive advantage. For instance, several different and potential strategic
choices can be identified and evaluated by simultaneously analyzing the association between
capital structure (CS), upper echelon (UE) and industry strategies (IS).
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In this study, a novel model for evaluating available strategies that companies are able to
implement is created. We test the developed model in ICT industry, especially from the point of
view of two major smart phone manufacturers, namely Apple and Nokia.
We show that by combining strategic choices pointed with UE, CS and IS, the subset of
implementable strategies can be identified. Furthermore, our model aids to identify strategic
choices which can be made available if a company develops its current management team and/or
capital structure. Interestingly, our model also shows an area where new industry strategies may
be invented. Also, our model clearly shows those strategic choices a company should not get
involved in.
We build a model based on existing and well established theories that have extensive empirical
analysis. As a result, the proposed model is able to specify suitable strategies that work for a
focal company. Our main contributions are the following: i) combining upper echelon, capital
structure and industrial strategies in a novel way, ii) we can explicitly point out suitable
strategies for a company, iii) we can identify new strategic possibilities and requirements for
pursuing them, iv) we can identify strategies that quite likely will not work for a company.
The study is organized as follows. The background is discussed in the next chapter. We build our
model in the third chapter and test it in the smart phone industry in the fourth chapter. Final
chapter five concludes our study.

2. Background
Strategic management research is rich in variety and there exist multiple and contradicting
theories, as does in capital structure research. However, some of the pillar research strands can
be identified and supported with substantial empirical evidence, such as upper echelon theory,
industrial strategies, and capital structure. As showed in Carpenter (2004), there is a strong
association between upper echelon theory and chosen strategies. Also, similar relationship exists
between upper echelon theory and capital structure (Bertrand and Schoar, 2004). Furthermore,
O’Brien (2003) shows strong links between capital structure and industry strategies. We examine
strategic choices in two commonly accepted postures of strategic adaptation in business strategy
level: efficiency and market focus (cf. Strandholm, 2004). We make this choice to develop a
model with minimum number of variables and to keep the model development manageable.

2.1 Upper Echelon (UE)
Upper Echelon (UE) theory proposes that organizations are reflections of their upper
management (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The top management team (TMT) interprets and
makes decisions based on their cognitive capabilities. The performance of the organization
depends on TMT’s decisions and actions. One of the key propositions of UE is that demographic
properties of TMT can be seen as useful proxy to TMT’s cognitions and values. This means that
in order to predict TMT’s decisions one needs to study only team’s demographic properties
which can be identified quite easily by an outsider. Another insight offered by UE is that the
decisions and actions that an organization takes can be understood better if TMT is considered an
aggregate, not individuals. This means that if the mean age of TMT members is 60 it is a better
indication of decisions than if we know that CEO is 60.
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UE takes it as a starting point to believe that managers and their action matter for the
performance of an organization (Hambrick, 2007). After almost 30 years of research the theory’s
main propositions are verified (Jackson, 1996; Carpenter et al. 2004). Also, important new
avenues have been opened with the second generation studies affecting important company
outcomes (Carpenter et al. 2004). Also, second generation studies have opened up the ‘black
box’ of TMT decision making processes and psychological factors (Hambrick, 2007). The new
avenues for upper echelon include connecting TMT decisions and company economics and
applying more dynamic models (Carpenter et al. 2004).
The focus of UE is TMT and it is important to make a distinction between top managers and
other managers. The original work of Hambrick and Mason (1984) focused on CEO and other Clevel managers in company. This might be due to the fact than quite often especially in US CEOs
are also the Chairs of the board (Hambrick, 2007). In our study we take a closer look at the CEO
and chair, since at least in European settings, nowadays they are separated (Levy & McKiernan,
2009). Also, European boards are actively involved in shaping the strategy. One should notice
that at the time the original UE theory was proposed, quite often the role of board was seen as a
rubber stamp (see Hendry & Keel, 2004). However, at the moment the board’s role is seen much
more active. Boards can be seen also as drivers of the strategy change (Westphal & Fredrickson,
2001).

2.2 Capital Strucutre (CS)
Since the seminal study of capital structure by Modigliani and Miller (1958, MM henceforth), a
large body of literature has covered the choice of firm’s capital structure and its association with
other firm characteristics, such as the firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and debt/equity
level on firm’s strategy (Sandberg, Lewellen & Stanley, 1987). The common factor for these
studies is to reach identification for a so called optimal capital structure, resulting in the
maximization of the wealth of shareholders. In their original model, MM show that capital
structure is irrelevant of the firm value. However, they assume the world without taxes, agency
costs and information asymmetries (for instance), i.e. perfect market condition. When taxes,
agency costs and information asymmetries are considered, the association between capital
structure and firm value becomes significant. The founding theories for capital structures under
imperfect market conditions are agency costs, pecking order, and tradeoff (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Myers, 1984; Mayers and Majluf, 1984, respectively).
In Jensen and Meckling (1976) the effect of agency costs on capital structure is examined.
According to the theory of agency costs are transferred to the debtholders (banks, creditors) due
to the firm’s higher debt level. Thus, shareholders’ wealth should be increased in higher firm
valuation and leave managers more room to act in the interests of shareholders, under reduced
agency costs of outside equity. Some of the pillar studies on agency cost theory on the capital
structure can be found in Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001).
Myers (1984) shows that the optimal capital structure is found with the tradeoff theory at the
point where the firm’s debt level increases no longer bring economic benefits by the tax shield
utilization. When the tax shield in higher debt level is exceeded by the increased costs of
financial distress, a firm should not finance the forthcoming investments anymore by debt.
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In the pecking order model by Mayers and Majluf (1984), instead of the optimal capital structure
- the preferred order for the sources of finance is examined under the existence of information
asymmetry. According to their theory, internal financing (retained earnings) is preferred over
debt and equity, since the use of external financing would be signals for unprofitable business
operations. Furthermore, as the announcement of a new stock issue is a negative signal to the
investors (especially when the stock price is low), managers prefer debt over equity.
Since MM (1958), numerous theoretical studies and empirical tests have been conducted to add
understanding, knowledge and explanations for optimal capital structure. However, the
convergence on the specific mechanisms of the optimal capital structure is still in progress,
although theoretical background is well established. Especially the empirical research results are
still unambiguous. It seems that industry-specific and/or country-specific features are partly
driving the unique capital structures of firms (Kim, 1997 and Wald, 1999). Moreover, strategic
choices may strongly be attached to the capital structure decisions (O’Brien, 2003; Barton and
Gordon, 1987; Titman, 1984; Sandberg, Lewellen and Stanley, 1987).
Furthermore, the debt/equity level connected to the type of firm (efficiency/market –based) is
one of the key issues when analyzing the strategic finance decisions of the firm. The financing
decision of the firm should always be closely positioned with the strategy of the firm, i.e.
correctly allocated debt/equity ratio towards the strategy. It seems that higher debt levels are
associated with efficiency–oriented firms (Jermias, 2008; Jensen, 1986; O’Brien, 2003; Simerly
and Li, 2000), and higher equity levels are associated with market–oriented innovative growth
firms (Jordan, Lowe and Taylor, 1998, Huang and Song, 2006; Aggarwal and Zhao, 2006;
Huang and Song, 2006; Campello, 2003; Qiuyan, Qian & Jingjing, 2012).

2.3 Industrial Strategies (IS)
Business level strategies have been an intensively studied area in strategic management literature
(e.g. Cambell-Hunt, 2000; Porter, 1980; Mintzberg, 1988; Hambrick 1983). There are numbers
of different categorizations but one of the most used frameworks is Porter’s (1980) generic
competitive strategies: cost leadership, differentiation, and niche. Although Porter’s model is the
basic textbook approach, there has been a lot of criticism against it (Cambell-Hunt, 2000) and for
example Mintzberg’s (1988) strategic categorization has been supported better by empirical
evidence (Kotha & Vadlamani, 1995). It seems, however, that there is quite a common
agreement that if we try to categorize strategies into two main classes these are either market
oriented or efficiency oriented (Strandberg et al. 2004).
Efficiency oriented strategies seek to find the most efficient producer in the industry and thus
achieve competitive advantage vis-à-vis other companies. Efficiency is achieved, among other
things, by investing in scale, keeping tight cost control, and minimizing overhead. The main
logic to achieve above average returns is to be the most low cost producer and thus having the
best return for money. Market oriented companies try to find the best match between their
products and markets. By having the best product in the eyes of the customer the company can
price their products higher, and thus achieve above average returns. Achieving this kind of
position, market oriented companies focus on marketing, R&D, and improving their product and
service offerings, to name but a few approaches. Basically it is agreed that companies must
choose their strategy from these two broad categories and mixing them will lead to disaster
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(Porter, 1980). However, finding the balancing position in the middle of both of these strategies
has also generated lots of research (e.g. Murray, 1988).

3. Strategic Choices Set Model (SCS Model)
SCS model’s basic message is that the universe of strategic choices can be looked from three
points of views, or three sets. One set includes those strategies that are known and actionable by
the TMT. Another is the set of strategies that have been proven to work within an industry and
the third one is the set that includes all those strategies that can be implemented with the
resources a company has. The figure (Fig. 1) describes the situation.
These three selected sets reflect the basic situation when formulating and selecting strategies in a
company. Classical strategic management approach (e.g. Porter, 1980) sees that it is industry that
dictates strategies, and the implementation of selected strategy dictates the performance.
Resource-based view (e.g. Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) describes what kind of resources a
company has and how it can utilize them in order to create competitive advantage. Also, its
related views - capability based view (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997) and knowledge-based view
(Grant, 1996) describe how those resources can be applied. Again, concrete resources a company
has can be seen in the balance sheet. Going inside the head of individual actors is a hard
problem. Upper Echelon theory uses the background of TMT as a proxy for their cognitive
capabilities and values. In the same way we can use capital structure as a proxy for the resources
a company has to implement its chosen strategies. Upper Echelon theory describes the choices
the company’s TMT makes. Also, seeing capabilities it may be argued that TMT has certain
capabilities to utilize concrete resources it has in its disposal.
All these three theories have the same central interest and focus, they focus on strategic choice.
Because of this central mutual concept it is possible to use these theories in concert. All of them
try to identify which kind of choices there are and which ones the company can and should
select. The linking pin is the TMT which makes the choice in a strategic situation and within the
industry with the focal company’s resources. It can be argued that quite often with a big
company these strategic sets are covering different areas and only part of all possible strategic
choices are in the intersection of all these three sets. However, it is exactly this intersection and
the strategies in it that should be selected by a company.
In SCS model we see all strategic choices creating a universe of strategic choices. The figure
(Fig. 1) depicts this situation. The box is the universe (U) containing all possible strategic
choices there are. There are three choices sets that include subsets of all choices (U). From the
point of view of a focal company three subsets are important, sets that are created by the choices
that industry has proven to work (Industry Strategies in the figure), strategic choices that TMT is
able to implement (Upper Echelon in the figure), and choices that the firm has resources to
implement (Capital Structure in the figure).
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Figure 1: Strategic Choices Sets in the Universe of strategic choices. The intersection of all
choices sets announce strategic choices that the focal company has chances to implement
successfully.

3.1 Link Between Upper Echelons and Industry Strategies
TMT chooses strategies that they know. When managers perceive strategic situation they will
choose from the set of strategies they are familiar with a strategy that (hopefully) will fit the
strategic options an industry offers. Strandholm et al. (2004) show that if TMT have background
in efficiency focused industries they will more likely perceive and select efficiency based
strategy, and vice versa for market focused strategies. There exists a strong empirical base to
believe that TMT’s will perceive and select strategies based on their backgrounds (see e.g.
Carpenter et al. 2004 for survey). Westphal and Fredrickson (2001) suggest that if a focal
company is experiencing a downturn, outside board members will suggest their home company’s
strategy if it seems more successful.

3.2 Link Between Capital Structure and Industry Strategies
As referred earlier in this study, the theory of capital structure is well established but empirical
evidence is lacking the convergence of generalization of specific conclusions. Part of studies
support leveraging approach where the optimal tax shield is applied by firms, while other firms
are engaged with low leverage – high equity setting in their capital structure decisions. We
review that leveraged firms are associated with non-unique products (Titman, 1984 and Titman
and Wessels, 1988), efficiency (Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Zingales, 1998), elasticity of
product demand (Maksimovic, 1988), product-market competition (Showalter, 1999) and highly
concentrated industry (Chevalier, 1995; Istaitieh & Rodriguez, 2002), while unlevered firms
often relate to innovation, new entries in market and competitive intensity (Hellman & Puri,
2000; Khanna & Tice, 2000; Jermias 2008), unique or highly specialized products (Menendez &
Gomez, 2000), profitability, growth opportunities and sales growth (Huang & Song, 2006;
Guzhva & Pagiavlas, 2003; Qiuyan, Qian & Jingjing, 2012). Furthermore, a powerful strand of
literature has been focused more and more on analyzing the relationship between capital
structure decisions and a firm’s strategic choices (O’Brien, 2003; Barton & Gordon, 1987;
Titman, 1984; Sandberg, Lewellen & Stanley, 1987). This seems an important research field
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which has not been fully utilized in understanding the mechanisms of capital structure. Thus, it
can be proposed that market-oriented firms are possible candidates for the low levered capital
structure policies and efficiency-oriented firms would choose high levered capital structures
instead.

3.3 Link Between Upper Echelons and Capital Structure
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) have studied the relationship between TMT actions and investments,
financial, and organizational practices. They focus more on the economic side of a company.
They go as far to call this the ‘style’ of the manager. Their study shows that different managers
behave quite differently in the same situations based on their earlier experiences and cognition.
They use MBA and age cohort as independent variables and look at what kind of financial
decisions, among other things, managers make. Bertnard and Schoar show that differences in
managerial practices are systematical and they relate to different performance levels.

4. Results
We apply the SCS model here. We have selected ICT industry as our focus with two companies
that operate on the smart phone sector, namely Apple and Nokia. We analyse the TMTs and
capital structure for both of these companies. We examine the potential strategies they are able to
perform based on SCS model. First we draft one possible way to understand what is happening
in the ICT industry and what kind of way of framing the strategic situation might give us insights
in the industry situation. This allows us to reason what strategic choices there are and what they
require from a focal company. Second, we take a closer look at the case companies’ financials.
This allows us to reason about what choices can be implemented financially. Finally, we look at
the TMT members and their demographic attributes that can be easily found out by outsiders.
Upper Echelon theory uses this approach to predict the choices that TMT is likely to be familiar
with and inclined to choose.

4.1 Industry Strategies for Mobile Phone Manufacturers
We focus on ICT industry and especially on the smart phone sector. Smart phones are a special
category of mobile phones. We consider that mobile phone industry itself is efficiency driven but
smart phone industry can be categorized as market driven. Smart phone industry is tightly linked
to ICT industry and we hypothesize here that most of the moves and strategies that are currently
being made in the smart phone sector are related to a bigger change that involves cloud
computing. Smart phones could be seen as the devices that are our interface to the cloud. We
know this is a big leap of faith, however, this makes analysis only more interesting and it does
not change the way our presented model can be used.
The basic element in ICT industry is the computer. Even today we follow the so called von
Neumann (1945) architecture, which dictates that computers have four central components:
processing unit, memory, input/output (interface), and system bus. The fifth component is the
programs (see e.g. Newell & Simon, 1973). The computer system is thus able to store programs,
run them and manipulate symbols.
One way to see the history of computer is to consider how these central computer components
are related to each other (see figure below). The first computers naturally included all of these
components inside themselves. Even the mainframes, mini computers, and PC’s could be seen
7

this way. The big step was when computers were able to communicate and exchange symbols via
networks. Cloud computing can be seen as the third major step when we are separating interface
from computer, and a massive number of computers and their computing power and memory are
behind a unified interface.

a) Computer

b) Internet

c) Cloud Computing

Figure 2: von Neumann architecture in a) Computer, b) Internet, and c) Cloud Computing

Technological change model (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) proposes that a technological
breakthrough initiates an era of technological variation which ends when a dominant design is
achieved. During the era of ferment many competing designs are introduced that are
incompatible. One of the reasons for this is that since the technological solutions are new, quite
often all of the components of technology must be in the hands of a central developer. Also, at
the start of a new technological era the designs tend to be monolithic rather that modular. After a
dominant design is selected starts the era of incremental change and modularization may begin.
We suggest here that cloud computing is in the phase of ferment, including smart phones and
their ecosystems, and that currently we are seeing a competition for dominant design. Our
hypothesis is that smart phones are important in a sense that they will be the interfacing device to
the cloud. There are multiple worthwhile players here, IBM, Google, Apple, Amazon.com and
Microsoft.

4.2 Capital Structure of Apple and Nokia
As stated above, smart phones industry is more market driven than efficiency driven at the
moment. This statement gives us a foundation to link such orientations to firms’ capital structure
analysis. Empirical exploitation supports the previous proposition in our model where market
driven firms use higher equity in relation to debt than efficiency driven firms (Chevalier, 1995;
Istaitieh & Rodriguez, 2002; Hellman & Puri, 2000; Menendez & Gomez, 2000).
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Apple’s capital structure as per December 31, 2011 (Q1) contains 90,054 million dollars of
equity and 48,627 million dollars of liabilities. Out of total liabilities, current liabilities are
34,607 million dollars (71%), meaning that long-term debt obligations are only a minor part of
the total liabilities (29%). Current liabilities are financial items durable for less than one year and
non-current for the durability of one or more years. Apple’s net sales in 2010, (65,230 M$) were
over ten times larger compared to the starting year of 2002 (5,740 M$). Apple’s cash and
equivalents at the end of 2011 are nearly 100 B$, which is enormously large. Apple seems to
have a clear competitive advantage and great financial possibilities to grab nearly any strategic
moves in its sight in the near future. The debt/equity level, which is one commonly used factor
for leverage, is 0.54 at the end of 2011 (ten year’s average for debt/equity is 0.63). For the
industry of computers and peripherals in US, the debt/equity level is 0.28 (ten year’s average is
0.26). Apple is concentrated on maintaining and reaching high equity (low debt) position
according to its financial strategy in order to have a full capacity for forthcoming strategic and
innovative investments. Apple has a well-established position in its market driven orientation in
both industrial and capital structure stand points. The capital structure with a high level of equity
clearly shows support for market orientation with a high potential of financial capability to get
involved in aggressive and innovative strategic operations. The financials for Apple and Nokia
are shown in Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3: Debt/Equity ratios for Nokia and Apple during 2002-2011.

Figure 4: Net sales and net sales per asset for Nokia (€) and Apple ($) during 2002-2011.
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Nokia’s capital structure as per December 31, 2011 shows an equity level of 13,916 million
euros and 22,289 million euros of total level of liabilities. The amount of current liabilities is
17,444 million euros (72%) and for non-current 4,845 million euros (18%). Nokia’s net sales
were 38,659 million euros in 2011 (non-audited). Compared to the starting year, Nokia has
increased only by 29 per cent in net sales compared to Apple’s increase of over 1000 per cent
over the period. The difference between Nokia’s highest net sales (51,058 million euros in 2007)
and the lowest (29,371 million euros in 2004) is 21,687 million euros. Nokia’s net sales have
dropped by 24 per cent between 2007 and 2011. The analysis of Nokia’s capital structure shows
some interesting results. When comparing the leverage ratio of debt/equity over the period of
2002-2011, we find that during 2002-2006 the equity is the major component (debt/equity < 1),
but after 2006 the role of debt is increased and seems to be in increasing trend thereafter
(debt/equity > 1). Nokia has been using more debt compared to equity in financing its business
operations after 2006. The current debt/equity ratio in December 31, 2011 is 1.60, namely the
capital structure indicates 38 per cent of equity and 62 per cent of debt (0.23 for industry in 2011
and 0.20 for industry average during 2002-2011). This type of high leverage is common for
efficiency oriented businesses and industries. However, Nokia is currently competing against
companies, especially Apple and others, which operate in the field of market orientation,
referring to smart phones industry. It is notable that Nokia is originally an efficiency orientated
company, but they have intentionally got involved in market orientation competition by strategic
decisions towards innovative smart phones productions. Such strategy would probably stipulate
much more powerful financial capabilities (high equity, low leverage linked to market
orientation) than Nokia’s current capital structure allows (high debt, low equity linked to
efficiency orientation). This type of financial position makes it very challenging for Nokia to
keep up with the key players in the smart phone competition.

4.3 Upper Echelons of Apple and Nokia
One of the main contributions of Upper Echelon theory is that even if the cognitions, values, and
perceptions of TMT members are hard to measure the managerial characteristics can act as
proxies for identifying underlying differences in cognitions, values, and perceptions (Carpenter
et al. 2004). Apple’s CEO Tim Cook has background in production and can be described more
like an efficiency focused leader. Chairman of the board is Arthur D. Levinson whose
background is heavily in research. Also, interestingly Levinson have also served as a member of
Google’s board of directors. Levinson was CEO of Genetech from 1995 to 2009. Genetech was
purchased by Hoffmann-La Roche 2009. Also, a new board member has been nominated from
Walt Disney who has done a few big company acquisitions lately.
Nokia’s CEO Stephen Elop has a background in periphery functions and can be more seen as
efficiency oriented. Elop has been involved earlier in multiple takeovers and company mergers.
Nokia’s Chairman is former CEO Jorma Ollila whose background is in financing, first in
Citibank and then in Nokia. From 1992 to 2006 Ollila served as CEO of Nokia.
Apple has all the technology and expertise within itself and it has not made any major
acquisitions. However, if it wants to have a bigger role in starting cloud computing markets it
needs to have a wider customer base. Apple has also identified the need for and meaning of
clouds and it has announced its own iCloud for its own customers. From a technological point of
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view Apple has all the required technologies in its own hands: OS, connection to cloud,
processing, databases and content.
Interestingly Apple’s capital structure allows it to select whatever strategy it wants. It has nearly
no long term debts and it has about $100 Billion in its disposal. Currently, a large market base
for cloud service usage is needed. It has hundreds of millions of content users in iTunes service
but only a fraction of users of computers and smart phones. This can be done, however, with the
aid of a new chairman of the board and new board member from Walt Disney with capabilities to
see potential in large acquisitions. There is a possibility that Apple is getting ready for some big
acquisition that will improve its market position in cloud computing. One possibility is
Amazon.com which has become quite a nuisance with its Kindle.
Nokia has earlier been an undisputed leader in smart phones only to slide to number three with
ever steeper downhill in front of it. It has stopped to develop its own OS’s (Meego & Symbian)
and trusts Microsoft’s Mobile OS. Also it is building up its own ecosystem around Microsoft’s
expertise. We can see that Nokia is quite heavily dependent on Microsoft at the moment, and if it
is not careful it might slide to the same kind of role as other bulk manufacturers that rely on e.g.
Google’s Android OS. If we look at Nokia’s role from the point of cloud computing it comes
quite apparent that its role is to support Microsoft’s vision. It is hard to imagine that in this
scenario Microsoft allows Nokia to operate independently and it can be seen that at the end of
this road Microsoft will acquire Nokia.
Nokia’s future will be determined by the success of Lumia series phones. If Lumia does not
create enough sales Nokia has to come up with new ways to finance its R&D. They must be able
to acquire money for development and there is only a very slim chance to attract debt money for
this purpose with Nokia’s current capital structure. Also, getting equity might prove to be hard.
So, if Lumia does not succeed there is a dark future. On the other hand, if Lumia succeeds the
future is not much brighter. In case of success one has consider if Microsoft is willing to bet on
Nokia as an independent company when real competition between clouds starts, probably not. In
this case Microsoft is quite likely to acquire Nokia.

4. Conclusions
In this study we have examined strategic choices and their creation by top management and how
the availability of choices is affected by industry and capital structure. We developed a model
and test it using two mobile companies, Nokia and Apple. Our model helps to identify the
strategic choices that are suitable for these companies.
We have created the Strategic Choice Sets (SCS) model, which combines theories of Upper
Echelon, Industry Strategies and Capital Structures. Upper Echelon theory states that companies
are reflections of their management team, and management team bases its strategic choices on
their own background. Industry Strategies includes those strategies that are in use in a specific
industry. And Capital Structure reflects the level of equity and debt and thus provides specific
financial possibilities for different strategic choices. In any given industry, there exist a set of
feasible strategies. Each and every strategy needs some kind of financial resources to be
11

implemented, and it is the top management that invests capital to implement those strategic
choices.
The SCS model is able to identify suitable strategies that work for a focal company. Our main
contributions are the following. Firstly, the SCS model combines three theories about strategic
choices, namely upper echelon, capital structure and industrial strategies. Secondly, the model
can explicitly point out suitable strategies for a company. Thirdly, the model can identify new
strategic possibilities and requirements for pursuing them. And fourthly, the model can identify
strategies that quite likely will not work for a company.
Top management team can use this model to identify the implement ability of a strategic choice.
The model shows if something is missing in order to implement the choice, regarding to financial
and management capabilities. Every strategic choice needs three things, (i) it has to work in the
industry, (ii) the company has to have the resources to implement it and (iii) management team
has to know how to implement it. However, sometimes you might want to try to create a new
strategy in the industry. In this case, you need to have resources and capability of the
management in order to try something new in industry. The model doesn’t guarantee that you
succeed, but it reveals if you have a genuinely new strategy in the industry.
We recognize at least the following limitations. First of all, the strategic sets might not be the
final ones. However, the SCS model gives possibility to identify other sets to be applied. The
assumptions used in the testing of the model, i.e. the cloud computing, might be dead wrong.
But, that doesn’t change the fact that the model is usable. We use the categorization with only
two classes - market orientation and efficiency orientation – which is of course very coarse. This
simplification is, however, testable and based on literature.
For further research, the presented model may be the basis for an entire research programme.
This is a lot said, but we feel that there is already so much empirical research done in the areas
used in the model. However, some of the areas need more thorough examination. For example,
the connection of upper echelon and capital structure is very thin and needs to be fortified. In
addition, what are the life cycle and/or dynamics of a strategic choice and a strategic set? The
application of the set theory might bring interesting results. Furthermore, there are intriguing
conflicts in the mechanism of capital structure. Thus, analyzing how the top management team
affects the capital structure decisions might resolve some of the conflicts. Finally, for future
research, linkages between behavioral finance and strategic choices set model are evident and
need to be emphasized.
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